Anand and Goyal (2009) propose a horizontal differentiation model to study information leakage and demand signaling in a supply chain. The authors present a composite equilibrium consisting of separating and pooling outcomes in different parameter regions and claim that it satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. We show that their analysis for the pooling equilibrium has errors and also that all pooling outcomes are actually eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion. The positive note is that if the undefeated equilibrium or lexicographical maximum sequential equilibrium (LMSE) refinement is adopted, a similar composite equilibrium will be achieved, which will lead to qualitatively the same results as in the original paper.
Pooling Equilibrium and Intuitive Criterion
Our analysis follows the notations in AG. First, to ensure that both types of the incumbent will pool at the same order quantity in equilibrium, the candidate pooling quantity should not be larger than
+ (see Lemma 4 in AG's Online Appendix). Second, to ensure that neither type of the incumbent can profitably deviate to be considered as the high type, in AG's Online Appendix). This belief system does not always support the pooling equilibrium identified in AG. 2 For the pooling equilibrium to hold, we also need to include the constraints to ensure that the incumbent cannot profitably deviate to a low order quantity to be considered as the low type. First, the high-type incumbent's profit under pooling should be (at least weakly)
higher than its profit from mimicking the low type by ordering a low enough quantity:
Second, the low-type incumbent's profit under pooling should be (at least weakly) higher than its profit from revealing its type by ordering a low enough quantity:
2 In a response to our comment, AG pointed out that the pooling outcome in their paper will be a pooling equilibrium if they change the belief system from equation (16) in their paper to one that "is akin to passive conjectures" (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1983): if the incumbent's order quantity is lower than a threshold, the entrant's belief will be the same as the prior, while if the incumbent's order quantity is larger than that threshold, the entrant's belief will be that the demand is high (A H ). However, the pooling equilibrium will fail the Intuitive Criterion, which we show in this comment. 3
Solving inequality (1), we get
Similarly from inequality (2), we have
In summary, for ∈ [ ( )min , * ] to be a pooling-equilibrium quantity, the low threshold in the entrant's belief system must satisfy ≤ ( )min ( ). We discuss the two cases regarding this upper bound of evaluated at
which is equivalent to solve:
We examine the two cases for . Suppose Next we solve constraint (2):
) , which is equivalent to solve:
We examine the two cases for . Suppose 
Essentially, LMSE selects the most efficient (profitable) outcome from the perspective of the type of the informed player that has the most incentive to reveal his or her true identity. In AG's setting, the LMSE outcome is the PBNE outcome that the low-type incumbent finds most profitable among all PBNE. The rationale for this refinement is fairly intuitive. Note that the high-type incumbent has an incentive to mimic the low-type incumbent but not vice versa, i.e., the low-type incumbent is the one with an incentive to reveal its identity. So, when both separating and pooling PBNE exist, if the lowtype incumbent makes a higher profit under the pooling outcome than under the separating outcome whereas the high-type incumbent makes a higher profit under the separating outcome than under the pooling outcome, then the pooling PBNE would be selected, since the separating equilibrium can be realized only by adopting an "unreasonable" belief system.
If LMSE refinement is adopted in AG's setting, the similar unique composite equilibrium will be achieved, which leads to the same qualitative results as in AG's original paper. The only difference is that the low threshold ( ) in the entrant's belief system under the pooling equilibrium should be = min [ ( )min ( ), ( )min ], not = ( )min as specified in AG. This is because AG missed some incentive compatibility (IC) constraints in their analysis for the pooling equilibrium.
